

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

28 April 1982

NOTE FOR: DDCI

FROM:

VC/NIC

SUBJECT: INR Proposal for Dissemination
of Monthly Warning Reports

1. We have done a preliminary survey and find that some field dissemination of the warning reports is already being accomplished (see attachment). The INR suggestion is consistent with our plans for adding system to the warning process and recommend you concur in principle.

2. The proposed reply has been coordinated with DDI and DDO.

cc: C/NIC
DDI
DDO

State Department review completed

	UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET
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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	NIO/W Chrono		
2	5G00 Hqs.		
3			
4			
5			
6			

<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/>	RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	FILE	<input type="checkbox"/>	RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/>	INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/>	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

4/28/82

SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000100040037-3

Washington, D. C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

SUBJECT : Dissemination of Warning Intelligence

1. Thank you for your suggestion to distribute the results of the monthly NIO warning meeting to overseas recipients. We think it is a good idea and have made a preliminary examination of its feasibility.

2. Some overseas distribution is already accomplished by both the DDO and DDI staffs for use by our stations and for sharing with other US personnel. This distribution includes our liaison officers with some military commands such as EUCOM and SAC. We agree that this dissemination should be systematically extended to more recipients, but such distribution must be done judiciously in view of the imperative need to keep the paper flow to field locations to a minimum.

3. We think that such a channel could also be expanded to include other warning intelligence such as topics from the weekly Watch Committee reports and topics suggested by the NIO for Warning. These latter in particular would address alternative views.

4. Because of the concern expressed above, we believe it best to build on the existing program. This still leaves numerous administrative details and protocols to develop. I have therefore, assigned those tasks to the NIO/W, who can pursue the effort with the assistance of the Warning Working Group.

15/ 04 MAY 1982

B. R. INMAN
Admiral, U.S. Navy

cc:

25X1 DIA - [redacted]
25X1 [redacted]
CIA - Mr. Gates
25X1 NSA [redacted]

DERIVATIVE CL BY Signer
☐ DECL ☒ REVW ON 4 May 88
DERIVED FROM _____

Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP83B01027R000100040037-3

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Warning Intelligence

DDI #3571-82

Distribution:

Orig - D/INR

1 - DCI

1 - DDCI

1 - Exec Dir

1 - C/NIC

1 - DDO

1 - NIO/W

1 - NIO/W Chrono ✓

1 - ER

1 - DDI Registry

UNCLASSIFIED

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI #3537-82

27 April 1982

STAT MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

STAT FROM : [REDACTED]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT : Monthly Warning Meetings

1. Current message distribution--see attachment.
2. Informal check with DIA suggests no problems with sending to military (U&S) Commands.
3. Technically there is no problem in disseminating to posts.
4. Suggestions:
 - a. Consider sanitized excerpts from Watch Committee reports, as appropriate.
 - b. Add warning staff topics/concerns; disseminate on ad hoc basis.
 - c. Provide guidance to station, base, embassy or command on releasability to host government Service, or Treaty Organization.
 - d. Provide dissemination list when dealing with foreign recipients, so each player knows what others have or have not been told. Most important in NATO arena.
 - e. Clearly label reports for use/sharing by "Country Team" at each embassy.
 - f. Shift to a "warning staff" report using the attached guidelines for a special report for the President.
 - g. Disseminate worldwide vice regional distribution.

Attachments

UNCLASSIFIED

STAT

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Meetings

DDI #3537-82
27 April 1982

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

1 - A/NIO/W

1 - NIO/W Chrono✓

1 - DDI Registry

STAT

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drafts advancing coherent alternative hypotheses. A deliberate effort should be made at this early stage to define both worst case and best case interpretations of the same information. As events evolve and the information base grows, these assessments would be refined and substantive differences sharpened. This process would establish a firm foundation for a decision to recommend issuance of an Alert Memorandum.

7. The formal monthly review process chaired by the regional NIOs should be supplemented and supported by informal initiatives on the part of the NIO/W and his staff (including the SWS.) The NIO/W, his staff, and the "referents" in NFIB agencies should seek out and encourage "alternate hypotheses" within the Community. The NIO/W and his staff should advance analytic interpretations and propositions which challenge both current intelligence judgments and the assessments emerging from NIO monthly reviews. The Evaluation Subcommittee Staff Report ~~da~~ endorsed the concept of "challenge teams" which would "force the analysts to justify their views and to examine conflicting hypotheses." The NIO/W should invite such challenges from any source in the US foreign affairs community, or outside the government, and ensure that the regional NIOs and their groups give these views serious consideration.

8. The central purpose of this array of formal and ad hoc procedures is to "loosen up" the NIWS, stimulate "warning consciousness" throughout the Community, and promote the earliest possible and most comprehensive examination of potential warning problems. The principal objective should be to enable the NIWS to issue warnings that are timely enough to be useful to senior policy-makers. There is no way to alter the iron rule that the earlier the warning the less specific it is likely to be. The NIWS, however, should have the capacity to issue at least initial or preliminary warning well before current intelligence reports indications (alerts, military movements, ultimata, mass demonstrations, etc.

which not only make a warning situation obvious to all but come too late for decision-makers to take pre-emptive or prudential actions to protect US interests.

3 Oct 1979

Reflections on the Special Report for the President

1. The essential purpose of a monthly warning report should be to provide a succinct but comprehensive check list and assessment of the current status of potential warning situations. We need a flexible vehicle which would allow varying treatment, in terms of length and detail, of a wide range of items. On the one hand, subjects which have been covered in recent reports could be treated, for continuity purposes, in a sentence or two if assessments and prognoses have not changed. On the other, items being covered for the first time, or those being reassessed, would require enough background and detail to clothe warning judgments with sufficient impact and meaningfulness. New, unfamiliar, and still inchoate items—which by the nature of things will be few and infrequent—should be elaborated in brief annexes—one page if possible.

2. The Special Report should lead off with a highly compressed check list which would provide a quick overview of the warning outlook. This list would summarize all items discussed in the Report, as well as note in a sentence or two the status of continuing "watch" items which do not require more extensive treatment.

3. The proposed format would be composed of three sections:
- a. A checklist or table of contents with summaries;
 - b. Brief discussion of the leading warning topics of the month, in one or two paragraphs.
 - c. Annexes which would introduce new topics or present modified assessments of continuing items.

Procedures:

4. A Special Report of this nature would require a more systematic and uniform approach than we now have. The present NIO warning assessments, which are essentially rapporteur reports of the monthly meetings, do not lend themselves well to the kind of rigorous and distilled Report proposed here. To be candid, most of the community analysts who attend NIO monthly meetings are not well qualified by training or experience to deal with the demanding requirements of serious warning analysis. Informal discussions of events and exchanges of views and information rarely probe very deeply into the warning dimensions of current developments. These meetings seldom perform the indispensable task of weighing alternative interpretations and hypotheses in a reasonably disciplined and objective manner.

5. Long experience gives little reason to be sanguine that current intelligence analysts—no matter how talented and well informed—will ever accomplish adequately the difficult task of shifting intellectual gears into the warning mode. Some improvements would be possible if office directors and division chiefs would take special pains to underline the priority of the warning function and follow up to ensure that it is receiving sufficient time and attention.. But we should recognize that the pressures and preoccupations of current intelligence are often the enemy of effective warning procedures and assessments. In most cases, it is asking too much of current intelligence officers to perform both tasks simultaneously. The preeminent warning hazards—excessive concern with details, preconceptions, congealed and unexamined assumptions, rigid mindsets, and deficient historical perspective and memory—may be unavoidable adjuncts of the insatiable demands of current intelligence.

6. The essential requirements of effective warning are a measure of detachment from the rush of current events and a sense of the potential implications of trends and specific developments. The dilemma for management is how to make sure that the system is giving adequate attention to these requirements. Line production officers are burdened with too many conflicting demands on their time and resources. The experiment with the NIO monthly meetings suggests that most of the participants lack the motivation, time, experience, and understanding of the unique demands of warning to tackle this task effectively. (An OPA analyst told me recently that he and his colleagues regard the monthly round of preparing for the NIO meetings as a nuisance and intrusion into their daily routines.)

7. If the Special Report is to be more than a summary of the results of the rather casual and unstructured NIO meetings, requirements and responsibilities will have to be defined with greater precision. There would seem to be four alternative "solutions"—all directed toward liberating the warning process from the chronic conservatism and inertia of the analyst corps:

a. With the approval and authority of the DCI, DDCI, D/NFAC, and NIO/W, procedural and substantive guidelines for the NIO meetings and monthly warning assessments could be developed and applied.

b. The respective NIOs could be charged with drafting more rigorous and detailed warning assessments. As agents of the DCI, they should be free to express their own views even if these depart from the consensus, if any, among community analysts.

c. NFAC office directors could be charged with preparing the assessments, in consultation with the NIOs. *Epecially pertinent now that offices are regional vs functional.*

★ d. The NIO/W could assume this responsibility, drawing on the SWS and his two assistants. The NIOs would review these drafts, but the NIO/W, in consultation with the D/NFAC and with the approval of the DDCI and/or the DCI, would reserve final authority over warning judgments presented in the Special Report.

8. If the years since Pearl Harbor afford one preeminent lesson, it is that if warning is to be timely and useful to senior decision-makers, it should not be trammled or stultified by being subjected to the normal process of institutional compromise and accommodation. "Coordination" inevitably is the enemy of both timeliness and clarity. Of all the diverse functions of intelligence, warning is preeminently the one that demands a clear focus of responsibility and a capacity to speak "loud and clear", free of the hedges and qualifications that are both unavoidable and justified in other forms of national intelligence.

9. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that warning at the national level—especially as defined by the present DCI—is uniquely the province of the DCI, and that he must retain the freedom to issue timely and unambiguous warning, in some cases well in advance of the ponderous process of reaching agreed community judgments—a process that will almost always lag well behind the flow of events and information. The distinction between warning and estimative procedures and judgments is vital, and the indispensable requirement for strengthening the national warning performance is to recognize the institutional and substantive implications of this distinction. STAT

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THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
WASHINGTON

Exemptions Registry

82-1143

April 20, 1982

SECRET

TO: Admiral B.R. Inman
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Warning Intelligence

We have had several recent expressions of interest from our constituents and missions abroad for more frequent US intelligence judgments on potential crisis areas such as Poland, the Middle East, Central America, Southwest Asia -- indeed, almost anywhere that the interests of the US, its allies, and friends could be involved.

It seems to us a reasonable proposition that the results of the monthly NIO warning meetings (now disseminated primarily among participants) could be sanitized and distributed to appropriate diplomatic and military posts abroad. I recognize that the NIO Warning Minutes at present are informal and do not represent coordinated national language; but we could and should incorporate alternate views as necessary. The NIOs can draft consensus where it exists, and it should prove of significant value for all of our constituents abroad at negligible extra effort to us. Moreover, I think such a procedure would lend purpose, discipline, and structure to our overall warning process, which would benefit us all and complement the recent expansion of the warning effort we have undertaken here in the US.

I would appreciate your reaction to this idea, and, if favorable, would like to raise it at an early NFIB. Meanwhile, I am sharing copies of this memorandum with CIA, DIA, and NSA as a basis for discussion of the idea in the NFIB.


Hugh Montgomery

SECRET

-2-

STAT cc:
STAT

DIA -	
CIA -	
NSA -	